A fuzzy Bayesian network approach for risk analysis in process industries by Yazdi, M. & Kabir, Sohag
A Fuzzy Bayesian Network approach for Risk Analysis in Process Industries 
Mohammad Yazdia, Sohag Kabirb,* 
aDepartment of Industrial Engineering, Eastern Mediterranean University, Mersin 10, Turkey 
bSchool of Engineering and Computer Science, University of Hull, Hull, HU6 7RX, UK 
 
Abstract 
Fault tree analysis is a widely used method of risk assessment in process industries. However, the classical fault tree 
approach has its own limitations such as the inability to deal with uncertain failure data and to consider statistical 
dependence among the failure events. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework for the risk assessment 
in process industries under the conditions of uncertainty and statistical dependency of events. The proposed 
approach makes the use of expert knowledge and fuzzy set theory for handling the uncertainty in the failure data and 
employs the Bayesian Network modeling for capturing dependency among the events and for a robust probabilistic 
reasoning in the conditions of uncertainty. The effectiveness of the approach was demonstrated by performing risk 
assessment in an ethylene transportation line unit in an ethylene oxide (EO) production plant. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, complex chemical plants have been rapidly developed to meet the increasing demand of process 
industries. As these plants usually process hazardous materials, their failure can cause serious harm both to people 
and the environment. For this reason, it is necessary to identify potential risks posed by such systems and then take 
measures to minimize the likelihood of these risks. To deal with the large number of accidents, incidents, near 
misses, and mishaps in process industries, different risk assessment approaches have been developed and widely 
used to perform a hazard analysis, thus enabling the prevention of an inadvertent incident and planning of mitigative 
actions (Khakzad et al., 2013a, 2011; Yan et al., 2016). 
The risk assessment techniques deployed for identifying and controlling the risks in hazardous industries might 
appear satisfactory to their users; however, in a real life scenario, there have been many cases of disastrous accidents 
due to the failure of such preventive measure, such as deepwater horizon explosion and oil spill in 2010, Fukushima 
disaster in 2011, storage tank explosion at loading port in Tianjin in 2015, the explosion of a natural gas (NG) 
factory in Belgium in 2004, and conflagration caused by NG leakage in Paraguay in 2004, etc. (Escande et al., 2016; 
Han and Weng, 2011; Khakzad, 2015; Taveau, 2010). The approaches used for hazard analysis in process industries 
include, but are not limited to, Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) (Dunjó et al., 2010), Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) (Vesely et al., 2002), and Bow-tie diagrams (De Dianous and Fiévez, 2006). FTA is the most popular among 
all available techniques and it has been extensively used for risk analysis in several industries (Kabir, 2017; Khan et 
al., 2008; Wang et al., 2002). 
A fault tree (FT) can be analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. A qualitative analysis minimizes a fault tree 
to a set of minimal cut sets (MCSs), which are the smallest combinations of events that are necessary and sufficient 
to cause the top event (TE), i.e., a hazardous event. A quantitative analysis mathematically calculates the occurrence 
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probability of the top event and other relevant numerical indexes, given the failure rate/probability of an individual 
element of a system. For this reason, the applicability of FTA for quantitative analysis largely depends on the 
availability of failure data. However, for most of the large and complex systems, it is often very difficult to obtain 
precise failure data due to the lack of knowledge, scarcity of statistical data, ambiguous component behavior, and 
the operating environment of the system (Huang et al., 2004; Kabir et al., 2016; Omidvari et al., 2014). In such 
cases, FTA cannot be used for risk assessment due to the lack of failure data. In addition to that, during the 
quantitative analysis, different events (e.g. intermediate events representing MCSs) in the fault tree are generally 
considered to be statistically independent. However, in real life systems, the events are not always statistically 
independent. For example, two MCSs may become statistically dependent because of sharing of a common basic 
event. For this reason, the statistical independence assumption about the events could lead to an inappropriate 
estimation of system dependability. 
In order to deal with the ambiguities and shortages of data in conventional FTA, extensive studies have been 
performed by employing fuzzy set theory in different areas. In recent years, Celik et al. (2010) and Lavasani et al. 
(2015a, 2015b, 2011) have used the triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to compute the failure probability (FP) 
of the top event (TE) with respect to an expert judgment in different chemical industries. Fuzzy FTA was applied for 
the reliability analysis of fire and explosion of a crude oil tank by Wang et al.(2013). Furthermore, Yazdi et al. 
(2017) utilized the similarity aggregation method (SAM) in terms of fuzzy set theory to compute the failure 
probability of a granule storage tank. Ferdous et al. ( 2009) used a computer aided fuzzy fault tree analysis for the 
same purpose. However, their model cannot cope with the dependency and redundant events in a realistic system. A 
potential remedy to this problem is to translate a static fuzzy fault tree to a different model, which is capable of 
capturing dependency among events and can also model scenarios with redundant events. 
Bayesian network (BN) is a well-known graphical inference method which expresses the causal relationships 
between the causes and final outcomes in a system (Rausand, 2011). In addition, BN has also been widely used in 
various engineering applications such as risk and reliability assessment (Abimbola et al., 2015; Bouejla et al., 2014; 
Hänninen et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2006; Khakzad et al., 2013a, Yuan et al., 2015), improving the safety 
performance of a system ( Herrero et al., 2013; John et al., 2016; Trucco et al., 2008), updating failure probability 
(Leu and Chang, 2013; Musharraf et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2015), and mapping static or dynamic FTs into 
corresponding BNs (Barua et al., 2016; Hänninen et al., 2014; Kabir et al., 2014; Khakzad et al., 2013a, 2013b; 
Marvin et al., 2017; Pereira et al., 2016; Yeo et al., 2016; Zarei et al., 2017). In a BN model, both forward and 
backward analysis could be performed. A forward analysis is performed to estimate the probability of unknown 
variables by following the arcs of the network. On the other hand, the backward analysis is performed by following 
the network arcs in opposite direction to update the probability of known variables based on some evidence. 
The objective of this study was to find a new approach for performing risk analysis in a more consistent way under 
the condition of uncertainty. In the proposed approach, a fault tree is used for qualitative analysis to identify the root 
causes of the hazardous event and the fuzzy set theory, along with expert judgment, is used to obtain the unknown 
failure data of basic events of the FT. The probability of the occurrence of the hazardous events and other related 
reliability indexes are calculated by translating the fault tree into a Bayesian network. The proposed methodology 
was applied for risk analysis of ethylene transportation line. The results obtained by the proposed approach are also 
compared with those obtained by the classical fuzzy fault tree approach. This approach offers an improved 
quantitative analysis of complex systems by eliminating the assumption of statistical independence among the 
events. Moreover, unlike the traditional approaches, the proposed one can be used for diagnostic analysis of 
systems, which is particularly important to determine maintenance strategies.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a new approach based on the fuzzy theory and Bayesian modeling 
is introduced that computes the failure probability of TE. A numerical example is presented in Section 3 to 
exemplify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed model. Finally, the conclusion and future remarks are 
described in Section 4. 
2. Material and Methodology 
FT is a well-known method which is widely used in failure analysis (Yuan et al., 2015). It is a deductive 
methodology that represents the interrelationship between basic events (BEs) and the root cause in a complex 
system. These interrelationships are typically obtainable as logical AND/OR gates (Bobbio et al., 2001; Rausand, 
2011). In order to find the probability of TE in a specific case, the failure rates of BEs are taken from standard 
reliability data sources such as OREDA (2002). However, as mentioned earlier, there some limitations, which might 
occur during the analysis, such as the lack of data for BEs or analyzing the dynamic system, which conventional 
FTA is not capable of. This section, to deal with these limitations, provides a new approach. A graphical overview 
of the approach is shown in Fig. 1. Hazard analysis, FT construction and data collection, Bayesian modeling, and the 
calculation are the four key stages in the proposed method, which are presented in details as follows. 
2.1. Hazard analysis 
In the recent decade, several methods have been developed for hazard analysis, e.g., HAZOP and FMEA (Khakzad 
et al., 2011). In this regard, all possibilities of failures need to be considered. Therefore, understanding the process 
thoroughly is the vital step. After completing the collection of information process, the identification of all hazards 
and menaces for any hazardous events that may cause damage to the equipment or harm to people and/or 
environment needs to be taken into consideration (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). Among all the mentioned analysis 
techniques based on brainstorming methods, the critical and hazardous system and sub-system can be figured out by 
employing a group of experts for further studies, such as causal and frequency analysis. In this study, the output of 
HAZOP is selected as a worst-case event. 
2.2. Fault tree construction and data collection 
The construction of an FT always starts with a specified TE placed at the top of the tree and the rest of the tree is 
constructed in the downward direction. The TE usually indicates an accident that can cause asset loss or safety 
hazards (Lewis, 1996). In order to complete a tree, the BEs that are denoted as the lowest level (leaves) of the tree 
should be known beforehand. In an FT, BEs are usually considered statistically independent and could be in any of 
the two binary states (failed and non-failed).  
As mentioned earlier, the exponentially distributed failure rate of known BEs can be obtained from OREDA (2002) 
and subsequently is transferred to failure probability by Equation (1).  
𝑃(𝑡)  =  1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡                                        (1) 
where P denotes the probability of failure, λ represents failure rate (the number of failures per year), and t is the time 
inspection interval. 
On the other hand, the three methods-extrapolation, statistical, and expert judgment-can be employed to estimate the 
probability of BEs with unknown or limited failure data (Preyssl, 1995). The extrapolation technique is based on an 
estimation approach, which is applied on a standard reliability data source, while the statistical technique implies the 
examination of data in a direct way to compute the probability of an event. Besides, the expert judgment method can 
be engaged to estimate the probabilities with respect to experts’ opinions. 
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Fig. 1. The framework of the proposed method 
In this study, the expert judgment method as a scientific consensus approach is employed to compute the probability 
of unknown BEs. Therefore, an integration of fuzzy set theory and subjective opinions to overcome any possible 
ambiguity can help the assessors (Yazdi et al., 2017a). 
The following section introduces a way showing how experts can be employed and weighted to obtain the failure 
data. 
2.3. Using expert judgment (Fuzzy AHP) 
Fuzzy set theory has been used in several studies to aggregate the expert opinions to overcome the possible 
ambiguities in failure data. The main aspect of the fuzzy set theory is how to quantify the qualitative index. The 
subjectivity should be avoided in order to get more credible and reliable results. A simple averaging method, 
regarding some criteria including personal experience, job tenure, and education level, has mostly applied in the 
literature for expert weighting. This approach does not provide sufficiently high objectivity (Lavasani et al., 2015a, 
2015b; Miri Lavasani et al., 2011; Ramzali et al., 2015; Yan et al., 2016; Yazdi et al., 2017b). Therefore, an 
extension of fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (FAHP) can overcome subjectivity issues. 
Conventional AHP is a well-known method, which is commonly used in multi-criteria decision-making problems. In 
this case, as conventional AHP method cannot deal with subjective knowledge, FAHP has been developed to solve 
the AHP problems (Gul and Guneri, 2016). In other words,  the main purpose of AHP is collecting expert opinions, 
though conventional AHP cannot reflect the human thinking. Several FAHP techniques have been proposed in the 
last few decades. Of them, the two most important were introduced by Buckley (1985) and Chang (1996), which 
used trapezoidal and triangular fuzzy membership function for a pairwise comparison scale, respectively. 
In this study, an extension of Buckley's method was used for weighting the experts, due to the limitations in other 
techniques, such as all fuzzy comparison matrices cannot be completely used. Besides, in Buckley's method, 
illogical zero weight may also be obtained for the selection criteria (Chan and Wang, 2013).  
The weight of each expert can be computed in a more reliable way on the basis of their knowledge and experience. 
Therefore, the computed weights are vital in order to represent the relative superiority of the employed experts. The 
next section introduces an approach based on the fuzzy theory to transform the linguistic possibilities of expert 
opinions into a fuzzy probability to aggregate their opinions into a crisp probability value (Altunkaynak et al., 2005; 
Duan et al., 2016; Mohsendokht, 2017; Shi et al., 2014).  
2.4. Aggregation procedure  
The aggregation procedure of expert judgment in the fuzzy logic system is divided into three stages as below. 
Stage 1: Obtaining linguistic terms of unknown BEs based on expert judgment 
Stage 2: Converting linguistic terms into corresponding fuzzy numbers 
Stage 3: Converting fuzzy numbers into fuzzy possibility scores (FPS) 
Further details of the mentioned stages are explained below. 
2.4.1. Obtaining linguistic terms of unknown BEs based on expert judgment (stage 1) 
The purpose of stage 1 was determining the failure likelihood of BEs considering the linguistic terms expressed by 
the experts. Several experts were consulted for this purpose and were furnished with a questionnaire by email to 
provide their judgment about the failure possibility of basic events. The linguistic terms, representing the probability 
of BEs, were scaled at seven levels: very high (VH), high (H), fairly high (FH), medium (M), fairly low (FL), low 
(L), and very low (VL). These levels were based on Saaty's approach (Saaty and Ozdemir, 2003), who discussed that 
the proper number for expert judgment at a specified time is between five and nine or in the other words the 
common capacity of human judgment is seven plus/minus two chunks. 
2.4.2. Converting linguistic terms into corresponding fuzzy numbers (stage 2) 
There are many applications of fuzzy set theory to deal with uncertainties and inaccuracy in expert judgments in 
linguistic terms such as triangular, trapezoidal, intuitionistic, and Gaussian fuzzy membership function (Atanassov, 
2012; Purba et al., 2014). The guarantee of the best membership function is based on realistic circumstances  
(Markowski and Mannan, 2008). In earlier studies, triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers have been found to be 
effective for risk assessment purpose (Ferdous et al., 2013; Lavasani et al., 2015a, 2015b; Mardani et al., 2015; 
Ramzali et al., 2015; Yazdi, 2017). Therefore, both triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers were utilized to map 
linguistic opinions to fuzzy membership function. The reason of using these two types of fuzzy numbers is that 
under some weak assumptions, the defined membership functions can directly meet the appropriate optimization 
criteria (Pedrycz, 1994). 
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Fig. 2. Fuzzy membership functions 
In this way, a corresponding fuzzy number for each linguistic term could be obtained. Further, it is necessary to 
aggregate subjective opinions of experts regarding identified BEs into a single opinion. Various techniques are 
available in the literature to aggregate experts' opinions such as linear opinion pool, max-min Delphi, sum-product, 
max-product, and similarity aggregation (Aqlan and Mustafa Ali, 2014; Ishikawa et al., 1993; Ross, 2009). 
However, Liu et al.(2014) discussed that there is no way to show which method has superiority to the other one. 
The sum-production algorithm, which is used in this study for the aggregation process could be presented as follows. 
𝑍𝑖 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗 . 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  , 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑚      𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛                                            (2) 
where 𝑍𝑖 denotes the aggregated fuzzy number for BEi, 𝑤𝑗 represents the weight of experts j, and 𝑓𝑖𝑗is corresponding 
fuzzy number of BEi given by expert j. n and m are the number of experts and BEs respectively. The 𝛼-cut is a 
commonly used method to operate the fuzzy membership function (Lowen, 1996; Mesiar, 2007; Ross, 2009; Zhang 
et al., 2017). 
2.4.3. Converting fuzzy numbers into fuzzy possibility scores (FPS) (stage 3) 
FPS denotes a crisp value that is based on experts’ opinions aggregated for a possible event. In order to defuzzify a 
quantifiable outcome in the fuzzy set theory, several common techniques are available including the center of area 
(CoA), the center of the largest area, max-min, bisector, weighted average, mean max, and the center of sum 
(Akkurt et al., 2004; Ross, 2009). In this study, the max-min aggregation methods, proposed by Chen and Hwang 
(1992), was used for defuzzification process (Shi et al., 2014).The maximum and minimum fuzzy sets are expressed 
as follows. 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥) = {
𝑥,        (0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1)
0,         (otherwise)
                (3) 
 
𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑥) = {
1 − 𝑥,        (0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1)
    0,            (otherwise)
      (4) 
Subsequently, the right and left score of fuzzy set (Z) can be computed as follows, respectively. 
𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑍) = [𝑓𝑧(𝑥) ⋀ 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥)]𝑥
𝑠𝑢𝑝 = 
(1 − 𝑑)
[1 + (𝑑 − 𝑐)]⁄              (5) 
𝐹𝑃𝑆𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡(𝑍) = [𝑓𝑧(𝑥) ⋀ 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑥)]𝑥
𝑠𝑢𝑝 = 
(1 − 𝑎)
[1 + (𝑏 − 𝑎)]⁄                (6) 
In addition, the relationship between left and right side of fuzzy set (Z) is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3.The schematic computation of right and left FPS 
Therefore, the fuzzy possibility scores of fuzzy number 𝑍𝑖 can be obtained by the following equation. 
𝐹𝑃𝑆(𝑍𝑖) = [𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑍𝑖) + 1 − 𝐹𝑃𝑆𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡(𝑍𝑖)] 2⁄                                     (7) 
Thus the aggregated FPS with respect to experts’ weight is computed for each BE. In the next section, the failure 
probability calculation process and mapping of FT into BN for executing further actions are explained. 
2.5. Calculation and Bayesian Modeling 
2.5.1. The calculation of failure probability and TE probability 
FPS are converted to failure probability by using following equation proposed by Onisawa (1990). 
Failure probability = {1 10
𝑘       𝐹𝑃𝑆 ≠ 0⁄
     0           𝐹𝑃𝑆 = 0
                               (8) 
𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑍) 
𝐹𝑃𝑆𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡(𝑍) 
𝑦 = 𝑥 
𝑦 = 1 − 𝑥 
𝑘 = 2.301 × [(1 − 𝐹𝑃𝑆)/𝐹𝑃𝑆]1 3⁄                                             (9) 
The process of transferring linguistic terms into failure probabilities considering 𝛼-cut methods is completed at this 
point. Therefore, by following the above processes failure probability of all BEs can be computed. Moreover, using 
Boolean algebra and the failure probability of the BEs, the failure probability of TE can be computed (Banerjee, 
2003). This process is known as the analytical method for quantifying FTs. 
2.5.2. Bayesian Modeling 
2.5.2.1. Bayesian Network 
Similar to FT, BN is a probabilistic graphical technique, which is widely used for constructing system reliability 
models based on uncertain knowledge (Khakzad et al., 2013, 2011; Zarei et al., 2017). BN results in a directed 
acyclic graph that includes the set of nodes denoting the variables, which are connected by directed arcs. The arcs 
represent the probabilistic causal relationship between the variables and Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) are 
set to the nodes in order to represent the conditional dependencies. 
According to conditional dependency of variables and chain rules, BN denoted the joint probability distribution of 
set of variables as follows (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007): 
𝑃(𝑈) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ∣ 𝑋𝑖+1, …𝑋𝑛)
𝑛−1
𝑖=1                                         (10) 
Where 𝑈 = {𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛} and 𝑋𝑖+1is the parent of 𝑋𝑖. Accordingly, the probability of 𝑋𝑖 can be computed as: 
𝑃(𝑋𝑖) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑈)𝑈∖𝑋𝑖                                                           (11) 
The risk and reliability analysis is a well-known application of BN to update the prior failure probabilities of 
specified events, given the new information in the form of evidence. This information is usually based on expert 
knowledge or becomes available in the lifecycle of processes, such as accidents, incidents, near misses, mishaps, etc. 
Therefore, BN allows reaching a better analysis in a dependable situation of a complex system including common 
cause failure (CCF) and diagnostic reasoning (Bobbio et al., 2001). 
Based on Bayes theorem, BN can be used to update the prior probability of an event (E): 
𝑃(𝑈 ∣ 𝐸 ) =
𝑃(𝑈∩𝐸)
𝑃(𝐸)
=
𝑃(𝑈∩𝐸)
∑ 𝑃(𝑈∩𝐸)𝑈
                                           (12) 
In the case of FT, it can be shown as follows: 
𝑃 (𝐵𝐸𝑘 ∣
∣ 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘 ) =
𝑃(𝐵𝐸𝑘∩𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘
)
𝑃(𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘
)
=
𝑃(𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘 ∣∣
∣𝐵𝐸𝑘 )∙𝑃(𝐵𝐸𝑘)
𝑃(𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘
)
      (13) 
where 
 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘 represents the j
th state of “given new information” denoting the effect of new events on 𝐵𝐸𝑘 . Besides, 
𝑃 (𝐵𝐸𝑘 ∣
∣ 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘 ) is the posterior failure probability of 𝐵𝐸𝑘 given 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘; 
 𝑃(𝐵𝐸𝑘) is the prior failure probability of 𝐵𝐸𝑘 provided by expert judgment or standard reliability sources; 
 𝑃(𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘) is the probability of state j of the k “given new information” which is estimated from the BN 
 𝑃 (𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘 ∣
∣ 𝐵𝐸𝑘 )  is denoted as degree of belief in the failure of  𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘  given the failure of 𝐵𝐸𝑘 . The value 
of 𝑃 ( 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑗,𝑘 ∣
∣ 𝐵𝐸𝑘 ) can be found out by asking question from experts. 
2.5.2.2. Mapping procedure 
The mapping of FT into BN is based on graphical and numerical functions (Bobbio et al., 2001). In graphical 
mapping, top event, intermediate events, and basic events of FT are denoted as leaf nodes, intermediate nodes, and 
root nodes in an equivalent BN, respectively. In an FT, the top event and the intermediate events are always 
represented as logic gates. For this reason, to be able to distinguish the nodes representing the basic events from the 
nodes representing the logic gates in a BN, we used single circles to represent the basic event nodes and double 
circles to represent the top and intermediate event nodes.  In numerical mapping, the failure probabilities of BEs are 
given to the related nodes as prior failure probabilities. CPTs can be generated for all intermediate nodes based on 
the logic gates they represent ( see details in Bobbio et al. (2001)). Fig. 4 shows the simplified procedure of mapping 
of FTs into BNs presented by Khakzad et al.  (2011). 
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Fig. 4. Mapping of FT to BN 
2.5.3. Importance measures and Critical nodes 
In FTA, there are many importance measures available to measure the relative importance of each BE or MCS in 
terms of their impact on the occurrence of the top event (Modarres, 2006; Rausand, 2014). In parallel way, 
according to Bayesian theorem, the importance measures can be represented in the new approach and computed by 
their logical relationships in BN (Van Der Borst and Schoonakker, 2001). 
Birnbaum Measure (BM): BM of an event is obtained by taking the difference between the probability of the top 
event by setting the event probability to 1 and 0, respectively. 
In BN model, BM can be obtained as: 
𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖
𝐵𝑀 = 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 ∣ 𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 1 ) − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 ∣ 𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 0 )                                   (14) 
Where 𝑃( 𝑇𝐸 ∣ 𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 1 ) and 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 ∣ 𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 0 ) denoted the conditional probability of the TE for occurrence and 
nonoccurrence of 𝐵𝐸𝑖, respectively.  
Risk Reduction worth (RRW): RRW shows the effect of BE on TE with respect to non-occurrence of 𝐵𝐸𝑖. RRW 
represents the decrease of TE probability when a given BE is assured not to occur. It can be calculated from the BN 
as: 
𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖
𝑅𝑅𝑊 = 𝑃(𝑇𝐸) − 𝑃(𝑇𝐸 ∣ 𝐵𝐸𝑖 = 0 )                                 (15) 
The criticality of the nodes can be obtained by computing above mentioned importance measures. The rank of 
critical nodes is obtained as follows. 
𝑅∗ =
𝐼𝑚
∑ 𝐼𝑚
𝑛
𝑖=1
× 100                                                          (16) 
where, 𝐼𝑚 is the m
th importance measures and n is the number of BE or MCS. 𝑅∗ denotes the normalized weight of 
importance measures. 
The total weighing of importance measures can be computed as follows: 
𝑅𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
∗ = 𝑅𝐵𝑀
∗ +𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊
∗                                                        (17) 
Finally, the BEs is ranked in ascending order from most critical to the least critical BEs. 
3. Application of the proposed methodology 
 
The proposed methodology was applied to an ethylene oxide (EO) plant for an ethylene transportation line unit. A 
risk assessment study was conducted by Khan et al. (2002) for an EO production plant. In the study, most hazardous 
units, such as the EO storage unit, reaction unit, ethylene EO distillation column, ethylene transportation line, and 
ethylene reboiler, were recognized. It was suggested that further details of risk assessment are required for the 
mentioned units. In addition, ethylene transportation line unit was identified as the third major hazard in the present 
units. Moreover, the most probable accident scenario that can be expected in this case is the ethylene release due to a 
leak or rupture, causing a vaporized cloud to be formed and reaching to an ignition source resulting in fire and 
explosion. To find an optimal maintenance strategy, another study was performed on the above case study in (Khan 
and Haddara, 2004) based on risk-based maintenance (RBM) method (Khan and Haddara, 2003). RBM 
methodology combines several pre-existing methods and tools such as MCAS (Khan, 2001), MAXCRED (Khan and 
Abbasi, 1999a), PROFAT (Khan and Abbasi, 1999b) and PROFAT II (Khan and Abbasi, 2000) to efficiently reach 
a maintenance decision.  
3.1. Overview of the Process  
EO is produced by the oxidation of ethylene and pure oxygen. The completed process flow diagram (PFD) of EO 
plant is illustrated in Fig.5. Ethylene and oxygen are reacted at 10-30 bar and 150-260ᵒ C in a fix bed catalysis 
reactor and has been transported from the storage tanks to isolated vicinity to the reaction unit through pipeline (see 
Khan et al. (2002) for more details). 
3.2. Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
3.2.1. FT Development 
The TE of the FT was selected as an ignition of vapor cloud which may lead to a fireball. The developed FT is 
illustrated in Fig. 6. The identified 25 basic events, which contribute directly and/or indirectly to the specified TE, 
are shown in Table 1. As mentioned earlier, the BEs with known failure rates are separated from the ambiguous 
ones. The failure rates of some BEs are determined by employing OREDA (2002) and the failure rates of the 
ambiguous ones are estimated based on the expert judgment. As shown in Table 1, failure rate data for 9 BEs were 
obtained from the reliability database, whereas the failure rates could not be identified for 16 BEs from the available 
data. 
 Fig. 5. Process flow diagram of the EO plant 
 
Fig. 6. Fault tree for the ethylene transportation line (modified after Khan and Haddara(2004)) 
3.2.2. Obtaining Failure Rates of BEs  
As mentioned earlier, to perform a proper risk analysis, it is necessary to access the historical failure rate data to 
allocate them to BEs. Thus, the probability of hazards with identified failure rate can be computed. The failure 
probability of the BEs with known failure rates were computed on per year basis (8760 h) and are presented in Table 
2. 
The process of obtaining the failure probability of the basic events with unknown data is described in the following 
subsections. 
Table 1. Details of the BEs of FT of Fig. 6 (modified after Khan and Haddara (2004)) 
FT Tag BEs Description Failure Reference  
BE1 Flammable gas detector fail Reliability data source 
BE2 Gas out of run Expert judgment  
BE3 Inert gas release mechanism failed Expert judgment  
BE4 Flame arrestor A failed Expert judgment  
BE5 Flame arrestor B failed Expert judgment  
BE6 Ignition source present Expert judgment  
BE7 Mechanical failure due to corrosion Expert judgment  
BE8 Leak from valves (two valves) Reliability data source 
BE9 Leak from bends (four bends) Reliability data source 
BE10 Leak from joints (10 joints) Reliability data source 
BE11 Flow sensor failed Reliability data source 
BE12 Pressure sensor failed Reliability data source 
BE13 Pipeline chocked Reliability data source 
BE14 Valve chocked Reliability data source 
BE15 High inlet flow Expert judgment  
BE16 High inlet pressure Expert judgment  
BE17 Pressure controller/trip failed Expert judgment  
BE18 High inlet temperature Expert judgment  
BE19 External heat source present Expert judgment  
BE20 Side reaction Expert judgment  
BE21 Temperature controller/trip failed Expert judgment  
BE22 Phase change Expert judgment  
BE23 Valves fails open (two valves) Expert judgment 
BE24 Corrosion Reliability data source 
BE25 Mechanical damage Expert judgment  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Failure probability of basic events with known failure rates 
BEs Tag FP of  BEs 
BE1 0.005155 
BE8 0.000613 
BE9 0.018486 
BE10 0.000438 
BE11 0.028154 
BE12 0.009937 
BE13 0.003186 
BE14 0.001313 
BE24 0.005917 
3.2.3. Rating stage 
As mentioned above, to compute the FP of ambiguous BEs, an expert judgment is employed. The expert knowledge 
is biased by individual visions and purposes (Ford and Sterman, 1998); thus, it is very difficult to obtain an impartial 
expert opinion. The main point here is the selection of both heterogeneous specialists (e.g., workers and experts) and 
homogenous specialists (in this case it includes only experts). 
It has been suggested that the impact of individual experience is smaller in a homogenous group compared to a 
heterogeneous group as a result of differences in the experience. Therefore, the main advantage of a heterogeneous 
group compared to the homogenous group is that all possible opinions of heterogeneous specialists can be 
considered. Thus, in this study, a heterogeneous group of experts including four specialists with different 
backgrounds was employed to compute the FP of the 16 ambiguous BEs. 
Expert No. 1: An experienced safety auditor and risk assessor working as consultant for complex chemical plant. 
Expert No. 2: An experienced technician working in different kinds of process industry. 
Expert No. 3: A senior chemical process designer from process engineering department with master certificate. 
Expert No. 4: An experienced safety officer working in a complex process plant with safety engineering certificate. 
 
Fuzzy AHP method was used to compute each expert’s capability and assigning the respective weights. The system 
of expert information is illustrated in Fig. 7, and the expert profile and weights are shown in Table 3.  
Expert capabilities
Job field Experience
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3
Education level
Expert 4
 
Fig. 7. Fuzzy AHP index system of respective expert capabilities  
 
Table 3. Experts’ profile and related decision weights 
No Job field Experience (years) Education level Weighing scores 
Expert 1 Risk assessor 7 BSc 0.249 
Expert 2 Process technician 5 BSc 0.126 
Expert 3 Process designer 9 MSc 0.495 
Expert 4 Safety officer 2 MSc 0.128 
 
Let's take, as an example, that BE23 valve fails to open. With respect to the definition of fuzzy numbers presented in 
Fig. 2, the qualitative terms, given by four experts, fall into “VL”, “FL”, “FL”, and “FH” categories. The integrated 
fuzzy number is attained as follows: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑤𝐸1 × 𝑓𝑉𝐿(𝑥) + (𝑤𝐸2 + 𝑤𝐸3) × 𝑓𝐹𝐿(𝑥) + 𝑤𝐸4 × 𝑓𝐹𝐻(𝑥) 
The membership function of aggregated fuzzy number can be obtained as: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑥 + 0.128
0.16
,    0.188 < 𝑥 ≤ 0.288
1,              0.288 < 𝑥 ≤ 0.363
−𝑥 + 0.463
0.1
, 0.363 < 𝑥 ≤ 0.463
0,                        𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
The right and left utility scores of fuzzy number f(x) are computed using equations (5)-(7) and provided as follows: 
𝐹𝑃𝑆𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡(𝑥) = 0.738 
𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑥) = 0.488 
𝐹𝑃𝑆(𝑥𝑖) = 0.375 
Using equations (8) and (9), the FP of BE23 is computed to be 0.001874. 
The qualitative terms based on experts’ opinions and FP of unknown BEs are shown in Table 4. 
3.2.4 Bayesian Modeling and Analysis 
Once the data for all basic events are obtained, the fault tree (Fig. 6) is mapped to a Bayesian Network (Fig. 8). The 
prior probability values of the root nodes of the BN are defined based on the values shown in Tables 2 and 4. The 
conditional probability values of each intermediate node of the BN are populated based on the type of logic gate it 
represents. 
In this BN, G1 is the node corresponds to the TE of the FT. Now running a query on this node would return the 
value of system unreliability. The value of system unreliability for the system obtained from the BN model is 
3.623E−09. The system unreliability was also calculated using the analytical approach and the value obtained was 
3.713E−09. This value is 2.48% higher than the value estimated by the BN based approach. This is due to the fact 
that the analytical approach does not consider the statistical dependence among the events. However, it can be seen 
from the BN model that some events are statistically dependent on each other. For example, the events represented 
by nodes G4 and G5 are statistically dependent on each other as they share a common basic event BE1. For a similar 
reason, nodes G9 and G15, and G17 and G18 are also statistically dependent. The effect of these dependences also 
propagates through the network to the node representing the TE. 
Table 4. Experts’ opinions, corresponding fuzzy number and corresponding failure probabilities of BEs 
BEs 
reference 
(E1 E2 E3 E4) 
Fuzzy corresponding 
number 
Defuzzification of 
subjective BEs 
Corresponding FPs 
BE2 (H L L FH) (0.300,0.400,0.413,0.513) 0.403 0.002391 
BE3 (FH FL FL FH) (0.313,0.388,0.512,0.612) 0.357 0.001581 
BE4 (M VL VL FH) (0.164,0.263,0.276,0.376) 0.403 0.002391 
BE5 (M VL VL FH) (0.164,0.263,0.276,0.376) 0.403 0.002391 
BE6 (H VL VL H) (0.264,0.364,0.364,0.464) 0.409 0.002509 
BE7 (FL L L FL) (0.138,0.237,0.275,0.375) 0.392 0.002172 
BE15 (M L L M) (0.213,0.313,0.313,0.413) 0.409 0.002509 
BE16 (M L L M) (0.213,0.313,0.313,0.413) 0.409 0.002509 
BE17 (FL FL FL L) (0.187,0.287,0.374,0.473) 0.370 0.001783 
BE18 (FL VL VL FL) (0.075,0.175,0.323,0.386) 0.369 0.001764 
BE19 (M L L H) (0.251,0.351,0.351,0.451) 0.409 0.002509 
BE20 (FL FL FL L) (0.187,0.287,0.374,0.473) 0.370 0.001783 
BE21 (FL L L L) (0.125,0.225,0.249,0.349) 0.398 0.002283 
BE22 (VL L L L) (0.075,0.17,0.175,0.275) 0.409 0.002509 
BE23 (VL FL FL FH) (0.188,0.288,0.363,0.463) 0.375 0.001874 
BE25 (L M M L) (0.286,0.386,0.386,0.486) 0.409 0.002509 
 
 
Fig. 8. Bayesian Network of the fault tree in Fig. 6 
One important aspect of probabilistic risk assessment of a system is to determine the critical components based on 
their contribution to the occurrence of the system failure. This information can help in improving the system 
reliability by taking the necessary measures such as by putting more design efforts on the weakest part of the system 
or by improving the system design by introducing fault tolerant strategies. The criticality of the basic events of the 
FT in Fig. 6 is calculated following the procedure described in section 2.5.3 using both the analytical and the BN-
based approaches. The results of the evaluation are shown in Table 5. According to the results shown in Table 5, 
BE6 (Ignition source present) contributes the most to the top event probability, hence, ranked as the most critical 
component. The second most critical event is BE1 (Flammable gas detector fails). If we compare the ranking of the 
events, we can see that both BN-based and the analytical approaches agree on the ranking of most of the 
components. However, there are some disagreements between the two approaches regarding the ranking of events. 
For example, the BN-based approach ranked BE14 as the least critical event and BE16 as the second least critical, 
whereas the analytical approach ranked them in opposite order. We believe that these disagreements are due to the 
statistical independence assumption of the events in the analytical approach. 
Table 5. Importance measures of the basic events based on the proposed approach and the analytical approach 
Basic Events 
Fuzzy Bayesian Approach Analytical Approach 
Importance Measure Rank Importance Measure Rank 
BE6 61.11595518 1 60.78163054 1 
BE1 42.64527082 2 42.40267113 2 
BE4 31.40830058 3 31.27437432 3 
BE5 31.40830058 4 31.27437432 4 
BE11 13.17872795 5 13.26074705 5 
BE9 9.075048388 6 9.222933652 6 
BE12 5.513108605 7 5.652468777 7 
BE7 2.330717673 8 2.409440162 8 
BE8 1.697741564 9 1.758326646 9 
BE10 1.626812341 10 1.685240449 10 
BE25 4.1572E-06 11 4.91542E-06 13 
BE24 2.74737E-06 12 2.08435E-06 14 
BE2 2.29668E-06 13 0.148964989 11 
BE3 1.98417E-06 14 0.128815433 12 
BE13 1.05226E-06 15 1.1711E-06 15 
BE15 9.46526E-07 16 1.1711E-06 16 
BE22 8.30669E-07 17 1.10664E-06 17 
BE23 7.43748E-07 18 1.10664E-06 18 
BE17 5.49543E-07 19 3.70671E-07 19 
BE21 3.85666E-07 20 2.25626E-07 20 
BE19 1.50746E-07 21 8.59526E-08 22 
BE20 1.32713E-07 22 8.59526E-08 23 
BE18 1.32241E-07 23 8.59526E-08 21 
BE16 1.17332E-07 24 6.44645E-08 25 
BE14 9.42206E-08 25 6.44645E-08 24 
 
We used the predictive reasoning on the BN model to obtain the system unreliability by following the directions of 
the network arcs. For predictive analysis, we used the information (failure probability) about the causes (component 
failure) to obtain the new belief (unreliability value) about the effect (system failure). With the help of an evidence-
based analysis, we can also perform a diagnostic analysis for the BN, i.e., reasoning from symptoms to causes. For 
instance, when an analyst observes that the system has failed, depending on this observation, his/her belief regarding 
the failure probability of the basic events can be updated. This means a posterior probability distribution for the 
components can be obtained given the status of the system. The posterior probability values for the root nodes of the 
BN (Fig. 8) are obtained by providing the evidence that the top event has occurred (i.e., observing the BN node G1 
to be true). The point to be noted is that this reasoning is performed backwardly, i.e., opposite to the direction of the 
arcs. Now, if we perform a predictive analysis based on this updated belief about the probability distribution of the 
basic events, then the value of system unreliability will also be updated. For this case study, the updated value of the 
system unreliability is 0.5407, previously it was 3.623E−09. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a comprehensive framework to combine fuzzy set theory and expert knowledge with 
FTA through Bayesian Network modeling to enable risk assessment of complex systems with ambiguous failure 
data. The proposed method addresses three important issues in probabilistic risk assessments, namely, the challenges 
of unavailability of failure data, the dependency of failure events, and the uncertainty. The use of expert elicitation 
and fuzzy set theory allows handling of the issue of insufficient failure data and also explicitly highlights the areas 
of uncertainty in the data. We used Bayesian Network for probabilistic reasoning to obtain system reliability related 
indexes and also to capture the dependencies among the events. The effectiveness of this approach was 
demonstrated by applying it to the risk assessment of an ethylene transportation line unit in an ethylene oxide (EO) 
plant and by comparing the results with the results obtained by the analytical approach. The proposed approach was 
found to be more robust and the results obtained were more accurate, as this approach does not estimate the system 
reliability under the unrealistic assumption of statistical independence of events. 
In the present work, we consider the failure rate of basic events as exponentially distributed. In future, we have a 
plan to extend this work by considering non-exponentially distributed failure data and the dynamic behavior of 
systems.   
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